Abstract
Introduction
Group and peer-to-peer communication in mobile cellular-21 based ad hoc networks (MANET) has been of enormous interest in recent years [5] . A dual-mode mobile station (MS), 23 such as the HP iPAQ h6315 [11] , is equipped with two different interfaces so that it allows to simultaneously communi-25 cate with a variety of mediums (e.g., Bluetooth, Infrared, WiFi) and infrastructure-based (cellular, access point) networks. 27
In other words, such an MS has the ability to locally initiate an MANET with other MSs for multi-hop communication by 29 employing the high-speed interface. Meanwhile, it can simultaneously access the cellular network [2] through the cellular 31 base station (BS). In such a scenario, a group can be defined as a set of mobile nodes in the MANET that wish to communi-33 cate with each other over a secure channel. The MANET with 35 infrastructure-support is achieved by a self-configuring networking protocol and provides many benefits [5] . For example, 37 it allows flexible peer-to-peer communication between two MSs by utilizing a high-speed interface without passing through the 39 BS, and thus releases the traffic load in cellular wireless systems. The localized MANET data transfer conserves the energy 41 in data transmission if the transmission range can be reduced.
With aforementioned scenarios in mind, key generation has 43 become a fundamental issue in supporting a secure MANET communication. It is well known that the traditional MANET 45 (i.e., pure MANET) endures a serious problem for key generation as there are no prior trust relationships among ad 47 hoc nodes due to absence of any centralized authority. In a mobile environment, it is difficult to identify an MS consis-49 tently with a unique identifier so that it is easy for an MS to change its identity, renew its key, and attack the MANET 51 again. Therefore, it is hard to establish a trust relationship by key creation among MSs in a MANET. A malicious MS can 53 use a forged MS identity to make feigned trust relations with other MSs, and then attack the MANET internally. On the 55 contrary, integration of MANET with cellular network enables 57
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availability of a trustable infrastructure (i.e., BS) so that vali-1 dation of MS's identify is feasible before any actual key generation. In order to establish trust relationship between any two 3
MSs in the cellular-based MANET, it is important to take advantage of cellular infrastructure so as to enable a trustable and 5 secure key generation before communication.
There are two types of key-based encryption techniques 7 [1, 12] that are widely used-asymmetric encryption using public-private keys and symmetric encryption with shared 9 symmetric key. Although the former provides a high level of security and scalable key management, it results in high com-11 putation overhead, and even unrealistic to support bulk data transmission as each MS has limited computational capability. 13 On the other hand, using a single key, shared among all ad hoc members for encrypting the group session key, may be 15 unsecured since a single key can be easily disclosed or compromised. Alternatively, if the cellular network generates and 17 maintains a shared key for each pair of MSs or other keys needed in the MANET, it poses heavy load on the key manage-19 ment in the BS, and causes frequent communication between the MS and the BS. As a result, the above key generating 21 alternatives are not applicable for the cellular-based MANET communication. 23 It may be noted that a primary issue for cellular-based MANET scenarios is to establish a trust relation within the 25 group. However, it involves several challenging steps. The support for MANET from a cellular network may involve 27 multiple BSs because the MS may be associated with several BSs, which requires appropriate collaboration among BSs. The 29 second issue is to maintain a secured channel between any pair of MSs in the MANET with minimal intervention of the 31
BSs. To initiate a trust relation between two MSs, a secured channel for key distribution scheme spans through the wireless 33 links as well as cellular infrastructure. Thirdly, scalability of key generation and distribution is involved in ad hoc commu-35 nication group-security. The bandwidth and energy required in key setup must also be reduced due to system constraints. 37
For a group security, it is imperative to maintain appropriate security association between key generators, distributors, and 39 receivers ensuring a certain level of trust between them. This problem has been commonly addressed in a way that logically 41 segregates the key management/distribution entities and group memberships. In addition, another challenge facing the group 43 key management infrastructure is that MANET members may join or leave at any time. In either case, the key has to be 45 appropriately refreshed, as it would otherwise enable an old member to be able to access the group data, even when it is 47 not a part of the group. To address the aforementioned challenges, a decentralized 49 key generation scheme is proposed in this paper, with the target of utilizing a cellular network for key management with 51 less computational and communication overhead. The proposed scheme enables every pair of MSs, with the ability to calculate 53 a shared symmetric key as required by using secure symmetric polynomial. In the proposed key generation scheme, the BS 55 only distributes a piece of keying material (i.e., a polynomial) to each MS so that every pair of MSs can compute the shared 57 key between them, rather than directly managing the key with an intensive interaction. The main contributions of the proposed 59 key generation scheme are as follows:
• Instead of an asymmetric key generation scheme, the pro-61 posed key generation takes advantage of symmetric polynomials by which a shared symmetric key can be generated 63 with minimal intervention of the BS.
• By using a cellular backbone for initial key setup and distri-65 bution, we employ the inherent security association and trust between MSs and the cellular network. The trustworthiness 67 of the third party (i.e., BS authority) is not achievable in a pure MANET. 69 • We are the first to employ a symmetric polynomial key generating scheme in a hierarchical and distributed manner for 71 communication in a MANET. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 73 provide a summary of related work and introduce the problem and the background of polynomial in Section 3. In Section 4, 75 we describe the main scheme of our distributed key generation, and present a method to reduce the communication overhead.
77 In Section 5, we do the security analysis and performance evaluation. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 79
Related work
Key exchange using symmetric polynomials has always been 81 an active area of interest over the last decade. Several schemes [3, 4, 9] have been suggested to exploit the symmetry in vari-83 ous kinds of polynomial. It was first applied by Blom [3] for a symmetric key distribution based on bivariate polynomials in 85 a conference scenario. The bivariate polynomial is maintained by an authority and a partially evaluated polynomial is securely 87 distributed to each conferencing user. Then, every conferencing user is able to compute a shared key with a peer user by 89 using the peer identifier. Theoretical analysis with respect to its security robustness is provided by Blundo et al. [4, 9] . The 91 benefit of using a symmetric polynomial is that each user only maintains a single polynomial with which it allows to compute 93 a common key for every other user non-interactively.
Recently, this idea has been used for pure MANETs and 95 wireless sensor networks [6, 8, 13, 14] . Kong et al. [3] introduce a polynomial scheme in which a distributed certificate is gen-97 erated for each node in such a manner that a few nodes initialized with the key generation material send shares of the 99 certificate to the requesting node. If the number of obtained shares is larger than a particular threshold, the requesting node 101 is able to calculate the certificate. Deng et al. [8] enhanced the polynomial-based approach and presents an ID-based key gen-103 eration scheme for a MANET. In this approach, a centralized server in a MANET distributes the shares for a master key, 105 based on which the individual key share for a node can be calculated in a distributed manner by using its identifier. 107 In a wireless sensor network, the system (i.e., authority) initially distributes a polynomial share (a partially evaluated poly-109 nomial) to each sensor node before deployment of the sensor. The polynomial enables sensors to generate a shared key in a 111
deployed network without any intervension again from the au-1 thority. Liu et al. [14] consider the fact that not all pairs of sensors have to generate shared keys in a wireless sensor network. 3 Sensors are static and shared keys are only required for neighboring sensors. By using the shared key between two sensors, 5 Liu et al. [15] further enable group key creation in a wireless sensor network. The security scalability [6] by using polyno-7 mial has been further improved based on the environment of a large-scale wireless sensor network. The purpose of Cheng et 9 al. [6] is to reduce the storage requirement imposed by memory constraint of sensors. 11
These schemes are not applicable for the cellular-based MANET since all of them are not entirely distributed as they 13 require the presence of a centralized server to initially distribute key generation material to nodes. In a pure MANET 15 considered by Kong et al. [3] and Deng et al. [8] , the infrastructure is not present and a mobile node acts as the authority 17 by distributing polynomial for each pair of mobile nodes, which may be unreliable in terms of trustworthiness. On the 19 other hand, in the wireless sensor network, the centralized authority pre-defines the polynomial for each sensor before the 21 deployment of sensors. As discussed in Section 1, the cellularbased MANET, mobile users may be associated with different 23 cellular BSs that may be charged by different authorities (i.e., service providers). Therefore, a key generation scheme needs 25 to take into account the security collaboration between them. At the same time, the key generation in cellular-based MANET 27
should consider the hierarchical architecture that the BS is on the infrastructure level and mobile users on the MANET level. 29
The security association in the MANET level again should be inherited from the security association at the infrastructure 31 level. 
Problem formulation and polynomial 33
Cellular-based MANET and key requirement
37
(e.g., BS i and j as shown in Fig. 1 ), which is connected to the cellular backbone. The authenticated server on the cellular 39 backbone maintains the information about the MS's identifier (i.e., IP address), billing, account, and security credentials. This 41 is equally applicable if BSs are replaced by access Points (aPs), served by the same Internet service provider (ISP), maintaining 43 the credential of each participating MS. Each AP performs the same functionality as a BS so far as the group is concerned. 45 Like a regular cellular network, each MS is able to securely communicate with its registered BS. The associated key be-47 tween MS i and the BS is denoted by S i-BS .
In Fig. 1 , the owners of PDA3 and Smartphone2 wish to 49 exchange confidential product drawings during a conference using ad hoc Wi-Fi technology. In such a scenario, one problem 51 immediately apparent is that their transactions would be open to any uninvited prying MSs within the vicinity. Thus, a key 53 generation scheme becomes necessary to enable securely peerto-peer data transmission between two MSs in the same ad hoc 55 group, which imposes the following basic requirements:
• Forward secrecy: A node joining the network should not be 57 able to compute the peer or group keys that were used prior to its join. 59 • Backward secrecy: A node leaving the group should not be able to compute new keys that would be used in the network. 61 • Key independence: A node that is not a member of the group should not be able to derive any information about the group 63 key from the knowledge of other group keys.
• Group key secrecy: It is computationally infeasible for an 65 adversary to derive the group key.
As stated in Section 1, the asymmetric key (public and private 67 key) involves high computation overhead in both encryption and decryption. Due to this, the need is to devise a symmetric key 69 generation scheme which could inherit the trust of the cellular infrastructure. By using the key generation, any pair of MSs 71 is able to compute a shared secret key between them before communication, and the group key can be further initiated in the 73 MANET group. Trust relationships are such that no MS from another MANET group should be able to decipher any MS's 75 conversation in which it does not participate in. In the cellularbased MANET scenario considered in this paper, a MANET 77 group corresponds to several MSs that wish to form a group for local multi-hop communication. These MSs may or may not be 79 under the same BS or under the same cellular service provider. Further, the computation overhead needed for key generation 81 should be minimized for the MSs.
Polynomial-based conference key 83
Polynomial-based dynamic conference key distribution [3] is an approach that an authorized server distributes a small piece 85 of information to a set of conference users in such a way that each user can compute a shared key with every other user to 87 use for secure communication. The theoretical analysis and its robustness of such an approach are further provided in [4] and 89 [9] . In this section, we present this approach and its limitations in the scenario of cellular-based MANET.
91
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Let us consider a symmetric key distribution scheme based 1 on bivariate polynomials employed by a central server. At first, the server selects a polynomial f (x, y) and keeps it secretly. 3 The function f satisfies the property f (x, y) = f (y, x). The polynomial can be evaluated by x = i, where i is the identity 5 of the node. Instead of the original polynomial f (x, y), the authorized server securely transmits the f (i, y) to the corre-7 sponding node i so that node i has no knowledge of the original polynomial. Thus, whenever two nodes wish to communicate, 9 they evaluate their individual polynomials with the corresponding IDs (i.e., IP address) of the other to get the symmetric key. 11
For example, node i having f (i, y) and node j having f (j, y) would calculate f (i, j) and f (j, i), respectively. Due to sym-13 metric property of the polynomial f (x, y), these two quantities would be equal (i.e., f (i, j) = f (j, i)) and would serve as the 15 symmetric key between these two nodes. To illustrate the above scheme, we consider three conference 17 users, having the identifiers of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In the beginning, the server selects a polynomial such as f (x, y)
The polynomial is kept secretly by the server. Then, the server cal-21 culates three polynomials by using the user IDs 1, 2, and 3 as follows: 23
The three polynomials (e.g., f (1, y) = 3 + 5y) are securely 27 distributed to the corresponding user separately. When two of the three users initiate the communication, each node just eval-29 uates its stored polynomial by using the ID of the other node to establish a pairwise key between them. For example, user 31 1 computes f (1, 2) = 3 + 5 * 2 = 13 and user 2 calculates f (2, 1) = 5 + 8 * 1 = 13. As can be seen, a shared key (i.e., 33 13) is calculated by users 1 and 2 without any interaction between them. In the same fashion, users 1 and 3 can establish 35 a shared key (i.e., 18) between them. The third node cannot derive any information regarding the group key between the 37 other two users (e.g., 1 and 2) without the original polynomial. Since users calculate the shared key separately without 39 the peer polynomial, then any user is unable to compute the shared key between other users. In other words, it satisfies the 41 group key secrecy. The theoretical analysis in [4, 9] shows that the generated keys have the property of key independence. For 43 example, the keys 13 and 18 in the above example have no dependence between them. The robustness against brute-force 45 attack increases with the increase of polynomial degree. However, the above scheme is totally centralized without the 47 consideration of the security requirements in a cellular-based MANET. In a cellular-based MANET, MANET members may 49 be under the coverage of different BSs and an MS cannot securely communicate with the BS that is not attached. The MS 51 can only securely communicate with the BS that it has registered with. On the other hand, it may be several local MANETs 53 in the region of neighboring BSs. For example, there are three 55 local MANETs around two BSs shown in Fig. 1 . Therefore, the group key generation needs to be a decentralized process, which 57 involves all BSs that MSs in a MANET are attached, rather than a single BS. The decentralized key generation scheme has the 59 ability for the communicating MSs with appropriate key generating polynomials through the BSs of their respective cellular 61 ISPs. In using a symmetric key, another underlying problem that has to be addressed is distributing the key and updating 63 it securely and efficiently. Instead of depending on a centralized server or a single BS, multiple BSs have to contribute in 65 generating or renewing keys.
For clarification, we first define the following terms that is 67 used in developing our scheme.
• A node group (NG) is the group of MSs in a local MANET 69 with the same polynomial distributors and derives its keying material from these leaders. 71 • An ad hoc node (AHN) is an MS that belongs to an NG.
• Polynomial distributor (PD) is a BS that acts as a polynomial 73 supplier to an NG. A PD is a founder-PD if it is involved in the initial key generation process. 75
In the proposed key generation, the PD acts as trusted authority for MSs and they collaboratively make decision on the 77 key (i.e., the polynomial of the each MS) and pass it on to their respective AHNs. As explained in the next section, our 79 proposed key setup allows establishment of a pairwise key using only one polynomial between any pair of MSs through the 81 cellular interface. In addition, the communication using this pairwise key can now independently take place securely over 83 ad hoc Wi-Fi for securely distributing requisite group session encryption keys. The detail of the proposed scheme is given in 85 the following section.
Decentralized key generation scheme 87
The principal objective of our scheme is to enable each MS to be able to securely communicate with any other MS. This 89 should be possible without any prior communication between the MSs. In this section, we present the proposed decentralized 91 key generation scheme.
In the beginning, a shared secret key S i-BS can be estab-93 lished between the MS i and its corresponding BS by a standardized MS registration process [1] . Then, each PD selects a 95 polynomial and securely sends to every other PD, after evaluating its ID using the polynomial. The original polynomial is 97 kept secretly. Upon receiving the polynomial from every other PDs, the PD combines all polynomials to generate a new group-99 based polynomial. In this manner, every PD has its contribution on the group-based polynomial. Every PD has no knowledge 101 of others. Then, each PD again evaluates the group-based polynomial by using the MS identifier and securely transmits to the 103 corresponding MS. The MS has no knowledge of the groupbased polynomial for the BS. When a pair of MSs evaluates the 105 polynomial again by using its peer MS ID, both MSs obtain the shared secret key. Once a secure pairwise channel is setup 107 between any two MSs, the group formation can be initiated without any further intervention by the BSs.
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The distributed algorithmic for the above key generation in-1 cludes four procedures.
• Group-based polynomial selection: At first, each MS regis-3 ters with the PD and a set of multiple registered MSs using respective PDs to form a MANET with a set of NGs. After 5 determining members in a MANET, each PD independently selects its symmetric polynomial (i.e., f i (w, x, y, z)) and are 7 exchanged between all the participating PDs so that a groupbased polynomial is created at each PD. Such group-based 9 polynomials are different at each PD.
• Polynomial for MS: Each PD again evaluates the group-based 11 polynomial by using the identifiers of the MSs. Pairwise keying material (coefficients of the polynomial) at the PD is 13 distributed to respective member MSs. Each MS obtains a unique polynomial. 15
• Pairwise key generation: Using this polynomial, each member MS can now independently generate a pairwise key by 17 appropriately substituting remaining two variables for every other member belonging to an NG. 19
• Group key establishment: Note that the above generated keys are not the group session keys and are merely pairwise keys, 21 which are then used to encrypt messages, including sending group session encryption keys, exchanged during the group 23 setup process.
In the following subsections, we illustrate the above procedure 25 in details.
Group-based polynomial 27
In the first stage of key generation, we employ a group-based polynomial distribution among the PDs. (
2) 43
The variables w and x represent the MSs and y and z denote the variables associated with PDs. The maximum degree of 45 this polynomial is t in each variable. Each PD i independently generates a t-degree symmetric polynomial as 47 where each coefficient a i,j,m,n (0 i, j, m, n t) is randomly 49 selected from a finite field GF(q), and q is a large prime number. The polynomial in Eq. (3) has four variables with t-degree 51 while the example polynomials in Section 3.2 are bivariate (x and y) with 1-degree symmetric polynomial. The extension on 53 the variable is for the purpose of representing the hierarchical architecture of the cellular-based MANET. The random selec-55 tion of a i,j,m,n ensures coefficients to be independent, without any correlation between them. It means that every number in 57 the finite field GF(q) has the same chance to be selected. At the same time, the choice of the polynomial is entirely dependent 59 on the PD. The robustness of the polynomial lies on the size of the coefficients and the degree of the polynomial. We note from 61 (1) and (2) that the polynomials have to be symmetric in w, x and also in y, z, which is ensured by Eq. (3). Thus, the coeffi-63 cient of w m x n should be the same as that of x m w n . In addition, the coefficient of y m z n should be the same as that of z m y n . 65 After having chosen the polynomial f i , PD i sends f i (w, x, y, j) to PD j , which could be a part of another cellular 67 service provider, as shown in Fig. 2 . To prevent the polynomial from being compromised, this communication takes place over 69 secured, pre-authenticated, backend cellular channels. Each PD i now obtains the polynomial P i as follows: 71
In the above polynomial distribution, each PD provides their 73 contribution for the final polynomial. Rather than the original polynomial f i (w, x, y, z), the PD i sends PD k with polynomial 75 f i (w, x, y, k) after the evaluation by using the peer PD identifier k. This ensures that each PD has no knowledge about the 77 original polynomial and the polynomial associated with others. We can illustrate this by using a simple example as given in Sec-79 tion 3.2. After the evaluation of f (x, y) with x = 1, f (1, y) = 3 + 5y has no information about the original polynomial of 81 f (x, y) = 1 + 2(x + y) + 3xy. Meanwhile, f (1, y) = 3 + 5y has no information of the polynomial of f (2, y) = 5 + 8y. 83 Therefore, the generated keys on the BS will be resilient to the attack assuming that a different BS has been compromised. We 85 will further analyze it in the next section. 
Polynomial for MS 1
Before participating in an NG, each MS (i.e., an AHN) should have securely registered with the BS by following a standard 3 registration process [1] . In the process of registration, the MS and BS mutually authenticate each other, e.g., the credential of 5 the MS has been verified by the BS and the BS is trustable to the MS. For example, the server on the cellular in the cellular 7 backbone as shown in Fig. 1 can perform the mutual authentication between the BS and the MS. If the MS is roaming, the 9 mutual authentication may involve the MS's home server. For detail, please refer to the book [1] . As one of registration re-11 sults, the BS generates a shared key such as S i-BS for MS node i. This shared key allows exchange of secure information be-13 tween the BS and the MS. At the same time, once polynomials are selected by a group of PDs, the PD can provide pairwise 15 keying material to the member AHN of corresponding NGs as follows. When a PD i obtains P i as shown in Eq. (4), it further 17 evaluates it at the ID of each of its group member AHN ki as
S ki (x, y) = P i (ID(AHN ki ), x, y, i). (5) 19
This quantity is now sent by PD i to AHN ki as represented in Fig. 3 
Pairwise key generation
In order to calculate a pairwise symmetric key with any other 37 nodes in the localized MANET, the node AHN ki simply sub- stitutes the ID of the other node for x and the ID of the other 39 node's PD for y. We demonstrate the effectiveness of key establishment process by considering the following example. Let 41 there be two PDs with IDs i and j and two MSs associated with these BSs with IDs a and b. Thus, AHN a receives the follow-43 ing polynomial coefficients and constructs the polynomial:
Similarly, AHN b has the polynomial:
As illustrated in Fig. 4 , if AHNs a and b wish to communicate with each other, node b calculates the key by using AHN a ID 49 and the corresponding PD (i.e., PD i ):
Similarly, AHN a calculates the key by using AHN b ID and the corresponding PD (i.e., PD j ): 53
Using (1) and (2) architecture. The only exception is when the PD of the new MS 1 is not included in the previous PD group. If an AHN leaves from the ad hoc group, the remaining AHNs are not affected. On the 3 other hand, if the polynomial of the leaving AHN is regarded as a compromised one, the system can totally recalculate new 5 polynomials and redistributed by following the above steps, depending on the security requirement on the robustness (see 7 Section 5).
Group key establishment 9
Let us consider two types of communication in the localized MANET. The peer-to-peer communication is between two 11
MSs. In this communication type, each MS can securely communicate with any other MS using the pairwise keys established 13 by the above steps. The symmetric key enables effectively data encryption/decryption, even for bulk data transmission by em-15 ploying a high-speed interface. The other type is group communication in which the group key is further required. The group 17 leader is defined as the initiator of the localized cellular-based MANET group. It can further generate the session encryption 19 key, K S0 , for a defined duration. Once the MSs receive their individual keying materials, the group leader securely sends K S0 21 over a high-bandwidth MANET to the other group members, instead of the cellular network. K S0 is then used for session en-23 cryption to form a secure group channel between the members over any high-bandwidth local ad hoc interface. 25
In the event of a member leaving the secure group, the member leader generates a new session encryption key, K S1 , and 27 sends it to each remaining member over the high-bandwidth localized domain. Alternatively, it can request complete poly-29 nomial re-keying from the PD for the entire group as discussed in Section 4.3. Likewise, a group join of an MS first involves 31 the generation of key for the new number by its PD, following Eqs. (4)-(7b). Hereafter, the group creates a new session 33 encrypting key and distributing it to every group participating member, including the newer joining entities. 35
Additionally, it is important to consider the security threat of a potential member authenticated by an impersonating BS, 37 BS . Firstly, the forged BS cannot be validated by the MS in the process of securely MS registration [1] . On the other hand, 39 since such a forged BS is outside the cellular infrastructure, it cannot participate in the group-based polynomial exchange 41 as illustrated in Section 4.1. Therefore, it is unable to provide the necessary keying materials that would enable an MS to 43 directly contact another BS until its secure channel could be established. 45
Efficiency improvement at PDs
We now consider how to select the polynomial by the PDs so 47 that the communication overhead among PDs can be reduced. In most applications, the cellular-based MANET is a localized 49 multi-hop network. Thus, the number of involving PDs should not be large. If there are n PDs involved in the MANET, every 51 PD sends a polynomial to every other PD, resulting in (n − 1) polynomial transmission. It totally has n * (n − 1) polynomials 53 that should be exchanged among PDs. The exchange of polynomial is also localized because PDs are neighbors in a local 55 region of the MANET. Furthermore, the exchange of polynomial passes through the hardwired cellular backbone, and thus 57 the bandwidth should not be a major issue.
On the other hand, we can reduce the communication over-59 head by selecting sparse polynomial if the number of PD increases. Let A i be the coefficient matrix of f i (w, x, y, z) with 61 dimensions (t 2 , t 2 ), such that the ( , )th element of the coefficient matrix A i denotes the coefficient of w k x l y m z n , where 63
We further represent the coefficient matrix A i by using two matrixes, R and Q, and each has t 2 items. 67 Let R be the matrix: We first clarify the motivation of choosing f to be a sparse 71 polynomial. Instead of transmitting the entire coefficient matrix, now only an indexed array of the non-zero coefficients may be 73 included in the transmission. Since this size is much smaller than the size of the entire coefficient matrix, the size of the 75 message can be drastically reduced.
On the downside, employing sparse matrices can make an 77 attacker (in most cases, a compromised MS) gain relative advantage by subjecting the system to a brute-force attack. How-79 ever, we observe that with a relative large number of PDs, the final polynomial of the coefficient matrix by Eq. (4) would 81 have a much-reduced sparseness. It is because each PD is independently and randomly selects its polynomial, and thus the 83 degree of sparseness in the summarized polynomial is significantly decreased. 85 To verify this, let s denote the probability of the element ( , ) of the matrix A i to be non-zero. Thus, 1 − s is the 87 corresponding probability of the element ( , ) of the matrix, A i being zero. The probability s for the element ( , ) of 89 A i (1 i n), being non-zero is s = (1−(1−s) n ) . Here, n is the number of PDs participating in polynomial exchange. This 91 probability is plotted in Fig. 5 . As can be seen, with an increase in the value of n, this s approaches 1. This result motivates us 93 to use the polynomial selection strategy. If the number of PDs is small, it selects less sparse polynomial. On the other hand, 95 if the number of PDs is large enough, the polynomials can be chosen to be sparse. 97 We present a technique to choose the coefficients in a man-1 ner, which is both secure and efficient. In order to reduce the sparseness of the matrix A i , we do the following: 3 (i) In the matrix Q, we randomly choose exactly one term out of the t terms z i (0 i t − 1), corresponding to each 5 term of y j (0 j t − 1) with probability 1 . Thus, we have a maximum of t terms chosen out of Q. 7 (ii) In the matrix R, we randomly choose exactly one term out of the t terms w i (0 i t − 1), corresponding to each 9
term of x j (0 j t − 1) with probability 2 . Thus we have a maximum of t terms chosen out of R.
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(iii) In the coefficient matrix A i , we allow a term a , to be non-zero only if corresponds to a row chosen in Prop. 13 (i) and corresponds to a column chosen in Prop. (ii).
By following the above steps, the polynomials are evaluated 15 for each individual AHN and the polynomial S is obtained by Eq. (5) would have all terms as non-zero if 1 and 2 are 1. 17
Security and performance analysis
Security analysis 19
As the security of the group formation mechanism depends solely on the pairwise key used to encrypt the group formation 21 messages, we focus our analysis on the security of the pairwise keys. The security robustness of the pairwise keys primar-23 ily depends upon the inherent security of our key distribution scheme. 25
In the process of group-based polynomial exchanges among PDs, we employ a "t-secure" polynomial for each PD. In the 27 other word, each PD generates a t-degree polynomial and the polynomials in Eqs. (4) and (5) are also t-degree since only 29 linear operations are performed in each step. The "t-secure" means if more than t polynomials are compromised, the adver-31 sary can calculate all the coefficients of the polynomial given in Eq. (3). Otherwise, the adversary cannot compute the key by 33 substituting the identifiers of the MS and PD to obtain the key used by the corresponding MS. The reason is that the adver-35 sary does not know the single coefficients of a i,j,m,n in Eq. (3) since the PD has evaluated the polynomial by using the identi-37 fier of the PD or the MS as shown in Figs. 2 and 3 . The adversary, who compromises an MS, only knows the linear combi-39 nation of the polynomial. In fact, the exchanged polynomials essentially form a linear system consisting of linear equations 41 like:
m, n t). (9) 43
When every coefficient a i,j,m,n is uniformly selected from GP(q) while q is a large prime number, the linear system has 45 a unique solution over GP(q). Indeed, the coefficient of the symmetric polynomial is any possible way to choose elements 47 over GP(q), and thus the key distributed to the MS is randomized. Therefore, the adversary has to know (t + 1) polynomial 49 f i in Eq. (3) to resolve the linear system for the purpose of determining the coefficient a i,j,m,n . The knowledge of t or less 51 polynomials f i does not convey any information on another f j .
In particular, such a polynomial system is further referred 53 to as t threshold system [3] , and our scheme is a hierarchical t threshold system. The adversary can combine the knowledge 55 from different levels to resolving the linear system given by Eq. (9) . In this hierarchical threshold system, the number of 57 colluding nodes differs at each level. This is primarily because of the unevenness in the distribution of each tier. In what fol-59 lows, we look into the number of nodes required at each level to carry out a successful collusion attack. We define compro-61 mise of the system as the situation where a node (AHN or PD) becomes aware of a polynomial (f, P or S) which it should 63 not know. f (w, x, y, z) . If the AHNs of the 83 same group wish to attack another node of the same group or 85 help if the number of colluding members is less than t. 
Performance analysis
The proposed decentralized key generation has two key ben-29 efits in terms of efficiency: (i) All the computation for the MS is linear combination without complicate calculation such as 31 multiplicative inverse; (ii) it has no interaction between the MS in the key generation. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate 33 the scheme for the message and latency overhead. To keep the analysis generic and to incorporate scenarios involving WLAN 35
APs as well as BSs, we have simulated the network over an ad hoc network running a routing protocol. 37 We carried out our simulation in ns-2 [10] . The number of nodes varied from 30 to 70 and the number of groups varied 39 from 3 to 15. The simulation area was taken to be 1000 m × 1000 m with a communication radius of each node as 200 m. 41 We fixed the speed of the nodes at 10 m/s. Finally, we used DSR as the underlying routing protocol. Although in a practical 43 scenario, members belonging to the same NG would be located next to each other, we have allowed the AHNs to be distributed 45 over the entire network area irrespective of the NG they belong to. The reason for doing this is to observe the worst-case 47 performance of our scheme.
We first observed the effects of the size of the NGs over 49 the routing overhead. Theoretically, with small NG sizes, the number of routing messages should be high, as more number 51 of PDs would need to communicate with each other. Fig. 6 plots the effects of the NG size to the overall network rout-53 ing messages during the key exchange process. We notice that with an NG size of 3, the number of routing messages is 55 very high. However, as the sizes increase, the routing overhead falls drastically and finally stabilizes. We attribute the 57 reason for this to the fact that for smaller groups, the number of groups would be higher and thus, the initial O(n 2 ) com-59 munication between the PDs would incur a very large routing overhead. 61 Next, we consider the effects of the threshold value over the latency in obtaining the key shares. A higher threshold value 63 would lead to a higher number of coefficients in the polynomial and thus the message sizes would increase. As shown in 65 Fig. 7 , an increase in the threshold values (t) leads to an increase in the latency values. However, the rise in the latency 67 values is significant for a larger network. This is because in a smaller network, the messages do not need to a travel large 69 number of hops and thus the delays are not significant. 
Conclusions 1
In this work, we have proposed a novel method for a fully distributed key management and distribution technique in 3 cellular-based MANET, assuming MSs to be heterogeneous by having a second radio for access to cellular BSs. The im-5 plicit trust for all communicating MSs is derived from the trust that an MS enjoys with the backbone cellular network. 7
In our scheme, we distribute key material to each node over this network in such a manner that any two MSs can com-9 municate securely with each other. Once this trust has been established, a group formation can be initiated, by any MS 11 with other MSs, without further intervention from the BSs. Further, these MSs can then communicate with each other over 13 any interface and need not require the cellular interface for communication. 15 In a practical scenario, MSs having Bluetooth interfaces can form secure localized MANETs and communicate with each 17 other, while enjoying the same trust as is provided in the underlying cellular network. Security analysis of our scheme shows 19 that it is robust to the collusion of a fixed number of nodes. However, by keeping the threshold values of the chosen polyno-21 mials high, collusion attack probabilities can be reduced drastically. 23
